The Battalion. (College Station, Tex.) 1893-current, July 31, 2003, Image 5

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Opinion
The Battalion
Page 5
31,200:
Attorney-client privilege attacked
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act is unconstitutionally vague
L ast Tuesday, U.S. District Judge John Koeltl
rightly dismissed two of the four counts of
indictment against attorney Lynne F. Stewart
for being unconstitutionally vague. Stewart, along
with three others, had been charged in April 2002
with providing material support to her client Sheik
Omar Abdel Rahman, a leader of the Islamic Group,
a fundamentalist Islamic organization that has been labeled a for
eign terrorist organization by the federal government.
Stewart has represented Rahman since being appointed to
defend him in 1995 against charges of conspiring to blow up
New York City landmarks, such as the George Washington
Bridge and the U.N. General Assembly building. Rahman was
convicted and is now serving a life sentence at the Federal
Medical Center in Rochester, Minn., according to CNN.
The charges against Stewart were highly troubling because
they resulted from normal activities in the course
of zealously defending a client. A lawyer is
required by legal ethics, such as those laid out in
the American Bar Association's Model Rules, to
defend any client - even unpopular ones - to the
best of his ability, something the government is
severely impairing with the laws under which
Stewart was charged.
Stewart was charged under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which
prohibits “material support” from being given to
terrorist organizations. The “material support” in
the law is defined as tangible objects such as
money, communications equipment, weapons,
explosives and personnel. The Department of
Justice used the communications equipment and
personnel aspects to indict Stewart with two
counts of criminal activity.
These are the same two counts Koeltl threw out last week for
being unconstitutionally applied in this particular case.
In May 2000, Stewart allegedly distracted prison guards to
allow Rahman and his Arabic interpreter to discuss IG activities,
particularly a cease-fire with the Egyptian government. Later, in
answering a question from the media, she announced the sheik's
withdrawal of support for the cease-fire. The government con
tends that in talking to the media, which the sheik was prohibit
ed from doing under the Bureau of Prisons special administra
tive measures, Stewart provided “communications equipment.”
Thankfully, Koeltl disagreed.
The legislative history of the law shows that Congress meant
to ban giving telephones, faxes and computers to terrorist organ
izations. They did not ban talking, which is what Stewart was
charged with. They did not ban one from advocating, thinking or
professing a foreign organization’s philosophy, which is what
Stewart was doing for her client.
The personnel charge is related to the communi
cations one. In talking to the press, which is a
highly normal practice with controversial cases
and clients and, the government argues that
Stewart essentially became a quasi-employee of
a terrorist organization.
The problem is, with this inter
pretation of the law, any
lawyer representing someone
labeled a terrorist becomes a
terrorist by association. As
Koeltl wrote in his opinion,
“the government fails to
explain how a lawyer, acting
as an agent of her client could
avoid being
subject to the
criminal prose
cution as a
‘quasi-employ
ee’ allegedly
covered by the
statute.”
Had Koeltl
accepted the government’s
interpretation of the 1996
statue, the ability of lawyers
to adequately defend their
clients would have been jeopard
ized. Their First Amendment rights
to speech, petition and association
would have been damaged, as well
as their ability to meet their profes
sional duties.
An acceptance of the government’s position
also would have meant that the ability of those
labeled as terrorists to find good representation
would have been destroyed; it would have pitted a
client’s best interests against a lawyer’s desire to
not be prosecuted for defending them.
In the U.S. legal system, everyone, no matter how unpopular
his ideology may be, deserves quality representation. Fair treat
ment in the legal system is guaranteed by the Constitution and
must be respected.
Rahman is not a popular guy; he’s been involved in terrible
things, but that does not mean that he does not deserve to be
treated fairly in the American justice system. It does not mean
that he does not deserve a lawyer who zealously represents him,
which is another requirement in the ABA Model Rules. The
lawyers who accept cases such as these should not live in fear
that they will be prosecuted for doing their jobs by defending
their clients to the fullest of their abilities.
Jenelle Wilson is a senior
political science major.
Graphic by Radhika Thirunarayanan
JENELLE WILSON
a
The problem is,
with this
interpretation of the
law, any and every
lawyer representing
someone labeled as a
terrorist becomes a
terrorist by
association.
Discriminatory alcohol-selling practices
Out-of-state driver's licenses and large parties turned away by supermarkets
T he war over the American
citizen’s right to purchase
alcohol has been fought in
this country for the past 100 years
and still continues. The
Constitution bears two scars from
the battle, though, after successful
ly upholding the right to have alcohol, each state
still must regulate its laws and guidelines.
Below that, each establishment that sells alcohol
has its own set of policies that are set up to pre
vent their employees from violating state laws.
However, several College Station grocery stores
follow policies that go beyond taking necessary
precautions. They harass the customer and by
doing so suggest that anybody legally buying
alcohol is a potential criminal.
College Station is home to some nationally
famous bars, one of which. The Dixie Chicken,
boasts that it sells “more alcohol per square foot
lhan anywhere in the world,” according to its
Web site. Despite the hectic setting, bartenders
and staff members must still check the ID of
every person buying a drink.
Grocery store clerks also share this responsi
bility, albeit in a more relaxed setting.
Obviously, their risk is minimal
compared to establishments that
sell higher volumes of alcohol to
more customers. A cashier on a
slow Monday night at Kroger like
ly isn’t distributing alcohol at such
a fast pace that he might acciden
tally sell to a minor. So one would think the
addition of extra store policies in regards to
alcohol sale is unnecessary.
Sadly, common sense does not hold true in
this situation.
The first of the ridiculous grocery stores’ poli
cies involves out-of-state licenses. While Texas
has created a driver license that makes it clear if
the holder is underage or not, not everyone in
town has one. Students move to College Station
to attend school from across the country, and
many hold identification from their native state.
A seller must take special care to correctly iden
tify another state’s license, as a forgery of one
may be easier to get away with because the other
state’s design is not easily recognizable.
Albertson’s and HEB keep a book in the
store that holds pictures of state IDs and driver’s
licenses from across the country so that if the
cashier is unsure of what another state’s ID
looks like, he can simply check the book.
Kroger, however, refuses to supply this book
and makes no such demands of their cashiers’
personal knowledge. If you attempt to purchase
a bottle of wine from Kroger and do not have a
Texas ID, its policy denies you a perfectly legal
exchange of your money for an alcoholic bever
age. This costs someone not only the hassle of
having to go elsewhere for the purchase, but the
embarrassment of having to put the item back.
The second and more insulting policy deals
with large parties of customers. If a group of
people comes into a bar, not everyone has to
have his ID verified by the bartender. When the
proud new owner of an Aggie ring wants to buy
a pitcher of beer, he is not turned away because
an excited, underage friend has come along to
celebrate. If you were to make the same pur
chase at Kroger, HEB or Albertson’s, however,
this would not be the case.
Refusing to sell a legal buyer an alcoholic
drink on the grounds that the people around him
are not old enough to responsibly swallow the
same substance punishes the customer by
assuming that he might provide the beverage to
his underage friends. This policy amounts to a
de facto accusation of criminal activity: the store
does not trust you not to break the law.
Why would any company’s customer service
include insulting and refusing to sell a product
to a legal purchaser? The last time such action
was legal in this country, they called it segrega
tion. While the reasoning for a business to
refuse a legal transaction is not so heinous as to
be based on the color of the customer’s skin, the
same application of baseless discrimination
should be equally repulsive to members of the
Bryan-College Station community.
The corporations behind Kroger, HEB and
Albertson’s can financially afford to engage in
practices that harass and offend customers
whose alcoholic purchases make up only a
minority of the stores’ sales. Should they choose
to continue engaging in actions that annoy and
turn away customers, however, one would hope
they have the good sense not to wonder why
their profits decline while local liquor stores and
bars prosper by the same amount.
Mike Walters is a junior
psychology major.
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Public school’s testing was an assault on privacy
hen a handful
of middle-
school students
skipped class last April
logo to a party near their
Manhattan school, they
probably didn’t think
leir punishment would involve any-
tliing more than an unexcused absence
ora detention. Upon returning to
Intermediate School 164, they learned
that news of the party had made it
back to administrators’ ears. To return
to class, the girls who attended the
party were required to be tested for
pregnancy and sexually transmitted
infections. They were also required to
provide administrators with the results
of those tests before admission back
into the classroom was granted,
according to The New York Times.
Although the girls cooperated with
Ike school’s requests, two of them now
have lawsuits pending
against the school. For
once, in an age of legal
triviality, it is a well-
deserved lawsuit.
Among many prob
lems with the situation is
that all students were not treated with
the same scale of punishment. A male
student who attended the party
received no penalty at all, whereas
some girls were suspended from school
until doctors’ notes were presented,
and other girls had to go beyond a doc
tor’s note and provide test results,
according to The New York Times.
Despite the differences in punish
ment, the bottom line is that the actions
taken by IS 164 were inappropriate.
The only possible acceptable response
from the school and the principals
would be a standard punishment for
any student who skipped school. The
SARA FOLEY
a
While the suspicion of
such actions... might
merit a lecture from a
counselor or parent, it
should in no way be
punishable by the
school.
actions that the girls may have partici
pated in while they were skipping have
no consequence whatsoever as far as
administrator intervention is concerned.
While the suspicion of such actions
might merit a lecture from a counselor
or parent, it should in no way be pun
ishable by the school.
Not only was the suspension of
these girls inappropriate, the require
ment of their test results is a clear vio
lation of privacy. When the girls first
went to the clinics to be tested and
returned with receipts showing that the
tests had been done, administrators
were not satisfied and demanded the
girls to produce written results of the
test. Although it was not said outright,
the girls’ temporary suspension threat
ened to be pennanent if the test results
were “bad,” according to cnn.com.
The school already denied these
students a few days of instruction
while they were trying to get appoint
ments and test results back. Denying
them education, especially in the
hypothetical circumstance that the test
results came back differently, is a clear
and horrifying instance of the school’s
lack of educational integrity. Even if
the girls had shown up pregnant and
carrying every STI imaginable, they
still have the right to an education.
The doctor who administered many
of the tests on these girls had deeper
concerns as well. By forcing the girls
to undergo tests they described as
“embarrassing” to The New York
Times, their image of proper sexual
healthcare could be damaged due to
the unpleasant first experience.
Public schools have every right to
educate adolescents on safe sex and
the dangers of sexually transmitted
infections. They have every right to
discourage illicit behavior and discour
age missing class. However, the deci
sions are ultimately left up to the stu
dents, and forcing the girls to uphold
the same values as the personal ones
of the administrators is not only
ridiculous, it is inappropriate.
Sara Foley is a junior
journalism major.
@ CS.com