

Battalion Editorials

Speak Now, Mr. Malik . . .

JACOB MALIK had finished his expected tirade against the United States. He had once again urged that Red China had a "just" claim on Formosa and that Chinese Communists were being denied their rightful seat in the U. N. He spoke, of course, in this country.

Then, without any particular relation to his previous words, the Russian delegate to the UN proposed a conference between both sides in the Korean War to arrange a cease-fire and an armistice providing for both sides to withdraw from the 38th parallel.

From all angles came reactions to this Russian "peace-bid." Those reactions make an interesting study, especially for those who have been hearing lately of long faces in the Kremlin at the turn of Korean affairs.

Most UN members jumped for Malik's words like drowning men to the proverbial straw. They admitted, of course, that the bid had been very indefinite. But, they hastily added, we can't afford to turn our back on anything. With bated breath they waited for further word from Malik or for an acknowledgement of the peace-bid by Red China.

U. S. State Department officials were not so eager. They didn't leave any doubt that they were interested in the bid, but they hastened to assure the rest of the world that skepticism clouded their interest.

This attitude was a very precise one, calculated to walk as near the middle as possible on the question. They could not scorn the bid, else the other nations might be angry. Nor could they afford to risk swallowing the bait, if that is what it is, whole.

Besides, the war-front provided a few confident quotes of "business as usual," "the situation is well in hand come what may," and others of a similar nature.

One strongly disbelieving voice was heard—that of South Korea. With its citizens looking back over one year of war that

had seen 3,000,000 South Koreans slain and another 10,000,000 left homeless (and this of a total population of 30,000,000), the little nation's spokesmen laid out the terms on which they would listen to peace-talks. That voice, though, drew scant heed in all the excitement.

Red China finally chimed in with endorsement of the Russian proposal and a threat to the United States of total defeat should the latter nation reject the bid.


And Malik? He and his friends in the Kremlin played coy midst pleas for elaboration of the plan he had suggested.

Speculation, of course, was running rampant. Some suggested that the Korean conflict was becoming an excessive burden to the Soviet Union. Stalin was merely saving face with a withdrawal. Others hinted it was a stall for time. "Propaganda," said others, hastily adding that there might be at least a little bit to the Russian bid.

Running high in the speculation was that repeated undertone that neither Russia nor the Chinese Communists were satisfied with recent Korean set-backs. The idea was expressed in almost a sneer—they want to back out gracefully, they know when they've bit off more than they can chew.

Scanning back over the picture, though, it hardly presents a view of a defensive Russia. It looks more to us like a prima-donna disdainfully enjoying the turmoil she had caused with a few simple words. What need would there be for Russia to be particularly worried when the clatter at her door assures her that her proposals, as empty as they have been in the past, are going to fall on eager ears.

Ah yes. Now, Mr. Malik, that we've upset your careful plans let's hear something from you. Speak, won't you. Oh, please, kind sir, say something.



What Has the Fighting Gained Us?

Has Korean Battle Been Worth Price Paid by US?

By HAL BOYLE
NEW YORK—(AP)—What is the price of Korea? Has the battle there been worthwhile to the United States a year later? What have we gained? World respect—and time to arm ourselves. And today we have a mighty field army.
What have we lost? Well, more than 70,000 Americans have been hurt or killed or are missing. Along the way some of those 70,000 casualties insisted on getting right back up into the fighting, and only in the last few weeks have been rotated home. The statistics of this engagement that began as a United Nations "police station" are on the staggering side.
We claim we killed or wounded more than a million of the enemy. They don't say. But the ambassador of our South Korean ally says the war so far has cost the

lives of 3,000,000 of his people and made 10,000,000 homeless. All of Korea, North and South, has about 30,000,000 people.
From a strictly humanitarian standpoint it therefore appears that we have given more death, misery and confusion to the South Koreans than we have liberty. And we have. That is only fair to say.
But we have kept the pattern of freedom pretty clear in the United States and elsewhere. And under the United Nations flag a solid right block has been thrown into Soviet Russia's attempt to take Asia by force.
History may yet say that his attempt to grab all of Korea by pure muscle was one of Joe Stalin's greatest mistakes. It is there he abandoned promises for attempted performance.
When a fellow has nothing better to deliver than a glamorous promise, he should remain a rain-bow man. He should never commit himself. Stalin does well as long as he holds out the symbol of a full rice bowl to hungry lands; he does less well when he has to find a way to actually fill the bowl and serve it.
His mistake? He should have kept on saying what he would do, and kept on not trying to do what he said he would do. A promise to do something is better propaganda in our present world than a real effort to improve a situation. Sad it is; so it is.
Few are left of the two American infantry companies who first engaged and slowed down the North Korean army south of Seoul. It was a spearpoint of 500 men against a mob of 250,000 or more.
They had to take the casualties because there was no one else who could break up the Red tide. They got more blame than credit at the time, but the passage of 12 months has shown they did well—considering.
Those first few who held the Korean dyke until it could be built stronger included a number of teenage kids who had joined the army for security. The breaking up of their dreams may be a small part of the price of Korea, but it is a big part to the boys who lost those dreams.
In a dozen months a magnificent U. S. U. N. army has been built up able to stay in Korea as long as it wants to, no matter how many more troops the Chinese may want to waste against it. The story of the Korean campaign has been this: the more they throw against us the less we have to retreat. As the enemy has massed, we have massed.
Let none say that Korea was easy. The weather, the fifth, the fortune of the enemy, the fact no end to the campaign was visible—these things made Korea difficult and memorable.
Today we hold a new "Chinese wall" of our own, a steel shell curtain against the iron curtain. Russia's bid by force has been blocked by force.
But the real price of Korea, the fourth costliest war America has fought, is the same old expensive bill paid before—the cost of unpreparedness.
And how can you ever pay back the loyalty of ready men who died to save an unready nation?

Road From Seoul Becomes 'Heartbreak Highway' of War

SAN FRANCISCO, June 26—(AP)—A year ago the road from Seoul to Suwon was a dusty country lane. It became the "heartbreak highway" of the Korean war. Today it rumbles with military power. It whispers also of the blood and agony that made this power possible.
There is no doubt in Asia that Korea opened the third world war. There is general agreement that what happens in Korea will largely determine whether the battle will erupt into global conflict.
North Korean tanks did more than invade South Korea when they charged across the 38th Parallel on that dismal Sunday dawn one year ago.
The attack meant a significant change in Kremlin strategy to rule the world. Gone was the blueprint for slow subversion as the principal imperialistic method. Korea was open aggression. It was a clear warning of the future.

Kremlin gamblers presumably surveyed the world to find the soft spot for open assault. They might have selected the United States. Instead they chose Korea, probably to secure the flank of their rich holdings in Manchuria.
Communism's "Pearl Harbor" attack failed. Red Koreans could have captured the peninsula in three weeks, against unsupported and weak Republic of Korea forces.
Unexpected United Nations support wrecked the battle plan. The Reds were stopped first by the raw courage of bewildered American infantrymen and initial air strength; then by history's first international police force.
This is a rough balance sheet for the allies at the end of the first year.

4. The West has proved it will not abandon the small nations of Asia and Europe, and has gained proportionate prestige.
5. The North Korean army, once one of Asia's strongest, has been mangled. The Chinese Communists have had startling losses. The result will be weaker armies and perhaps weaker determination of two of the satellite nations upon which Russia would depend in global conflict.
Debit
1. Allied casualties have been heavy. The financial cost is also heavy.
2. Most of the West's military strength has been hobbled to a peninsula of secondary worldwide importance.
3. The Russians have lost only one known combat man in a battle that has given them invaluable information on allied fighting methods and techniques.
4. Conflict has hastened the financial drawing and made inflation more dangerous in the West.
5. Communism still retains the initiative, in Korea and throughout the world. This is true militarily, politically and in the propaganda war.

Letters to the Editor

Aggie-Ex Reservist Scorns Policy For Recall--Rep. Teague Answers

(Editor's Note: This letter and the answer following were forwarded to us from Olin Teague, representative from the sixth Texas District which includes College Station. The person who wrote the letter has asked that we withhold his name because he has not personally informed his family of a new overseas military assignment.)

Representative Olin Teague House of Representatives Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Teague:

I have just learned of the provisions of the enlistment extension bill and am very surprised that the House of Representatives would permit such inequities to be perpetrated upon the Organized Reserve Corps. It is inconceivable that the period of 21 months should be lengthened rather than shortened. In 1945 I had my military interrupted and once again I find myself placed in the same situation; while men who have never served a day in the armed forces are being promoted above me in my civilian job.

The 17 months provision for inactive and voluntary reserve was fine, but I and others like myself who fall a month and a half short of one year service between Dec. 17, 1941 and Sept. 2, 1945, are discriminated against. Why not consider the total length of service up to 1946 or 1947 for involuntary reserves?

I and others from Texas A&M believe we are being seriously discriminated against. Please give me your views on this matter as I desire to present them to The Battalion at Texas A&M. I have been assigned to a second tour in the Pacific starting next month so please reply as soon as possible.
Name Withheld by Request

Teague's Answer

Dear Sir:
I received your letter of June 15, 1951 concerning the provisions of the recent Universal Military Training and Service Act which related to recall of reservists to active duty.
I believe the specific provision which you are referring to is that which states unless sooner released by the Secretary of the branch concerned, any member of the inactive or voluntary Reserve who served for one year between Dec. 7, 1941, and Sept. 2, 1945, shall be released after 17 months of active duty provided:
● He applies for the release.
● The military department concerned does not consider that he possesses a rating or specialty which is critical.
Otherwise, at the discretion of the President, reservists now on active duty or to be recalled to active duty may be required to serve 24 months. You will notice that there is no guarantee that anyone will be released after 17

months, only a recommendation that such be done if a reservist can be released. Further, it is not mandatory that any reservist, regardless of the conditions of his prior service, serve the full 24 months if the need is not present.
Let me say now that I do not believe the Reserve situation, or the handling of the individual reservists during the current Korean conflict, has been perfect by any means. As a matter of fact, some employers' attitudes and other aspects have caused many reservists to be penalized insofar as their personal life is concerned. On the other hand, to meet the demands of the Korean conflict there was, and is, a dire need for experienced officers. As a result, 119,000 officers were recalled from the inactive volunteer, and organized Reserve, and organized in the year just ended, at least half of which were non-volunteers.
The vast majority of these officers recalled had World War II service; many in the combat arms had already seen a great deal of combat. It was not, however, a question of like or dislike at the time; it was a matter of the overriding need for their services. Therefore, no matter how you look at it, when the need is there for officers and when most officers available are products of World War II, the majority of those officers taken will be the position of having to serve twice.
Now, the question comes as to who shall be required to serve twice. Naturally, the first qualification would be that he be a reservist for two reasons:
● The entire purpose of the reserve's existence is to have available civilian soldiers prepared to go first in time of an emergency comparable to the present one.
● You know, and I know, that the officers who could most quickly, as a group, take up the threads of the service again would be those who had maintained some contact with the service, no matter how superficial. And, time was a factor in the current recall situation.
As far as I know, this was the basis upon which the Armed Forces issued their recall of officers initially and up to date.
Second Qualification
In the recent bill, Congress inserted a second qualification. This qualification—more to the nature of a recommendation—was based on the belief that some recognition should be given to those who served during the period of actual hostilities in World War II, particularly insofar as those who were in some combat arm. It was necessary, therefore, to establish a minimum

length for World War II service to be considered as well as the period for which it would be considered.
As a result, one year service between Dec. 7, 1941, and Sept. 2, 1945, was arrived at as a fair "rule of thumb" in the matter. Unfortunately, any length of service or any terminal date set would have worked to someone's disadvantage who would have been close to being included in the recommended category.
As to your statement that Texas A&M reserve officers are being seriously discriminated against, I do not know it is true of Texas A&M reserve officers any more than any other reserve officer regardless of the origin of his commission.
Certainly, I agree that it is not proper that some men who have never served in the armed forces should be exempted and progress in civilian life while others need to bear the burden and serve twice; but persons in that category could not be considered as a source of replacement for reserve officers even if they were called into the service.
Final Analysis
In the final analysis, the armed forces in this current emergency needed officers for a quick expansion as well as replacements overseas; they could only look to the reserve for experienced officers of the type needed. That situation still exists although there is some hope that the middle of 1952 the pressure will lessen due to an increased number of ROTC and OCS graduates.
In my opinion, your situation is not much different than thousands of other reserve officers who dislike the idea of being recalled, but realize that it is a necessity and obligation which cannot be avoided.
As to the conditions of length of service, there might be some room for debate although I still believe that the general principal of releasing those first who served during the last war and were at least theoretically subject to participation in combat has much merit to it.
Considerable Hardship
I realize that it works a considerable hardship on those who have to be continually interrupted in their normal civilian pursuits to enter the armed forces, but I honestly cannot say what alternative could be followed under the particular circumstances.
I am always glad to hear from an Aggie-ex. If you ever get by Washington, drop into the office and see us.
Sincerely,
Olin E. Teague
Congressman

Johnson Calls Russia's Talk 'Two-Faced'

Austin, June 26—(AP)—The homecoming 27th Fighter Escort Wing heard Sen. Lyndon Johnson yesterday call Russia's peace talk "two-faced."
The wing is back from seven months combat in Korea.
"What you men of the 27th Fighter Wing have done over Korea speaks far more eloquently as a tribute to your valor than anything we might say here today," Johnson told the flyers.
"I wish it could be said today that the job is over for all our fighting men. The job is not finished," he continued.
"Soviet Russia, the master of the forces you fought in Korea, talks now of peace."
"That talk is two-faced."
"The Kremlin wants peace in Korea only because the Kremlin needs time to make war elsewhere. We must not be deceived. The Communists are not peace-makers. There can be no lasting peace on Communist terms," he said.
The senator added that the fight must be settled on "our terms."
"The nation that controls the skies will write the peace," he said.

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The Battalion

Lawrence Sullivan Ross, Founder of Aggie Traditions "Soldier, Statesman, Knightly Gentleman"

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Comic strip 'L'L ABNER' by 'The Bothored Bride' and 'The Uninvited'. Panels show L'L and a woman talking about marriage and social norms.

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